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The correlated equilibrium concept (Aumann (1974, 1987)) appears as the appropriate
solution concept in games where pre-play communication is allowed between the players.
In such games, the presence of a mediator allows players to use correlated strategies: the
mediator (privately) recommends actions to each player according to the realization of
an (agreed upon) correlation device. Hence a correlated equilibrium is a self-enforcing
correlated strategy prole in the sense that no individual has an incentive to deviate from
the recommendation received.
It is well known that the set of correlated equilibria is convex and contains the set of
Nash equilibria (considered as distributions on the set of strategy proles); therefore on
one hand the correlated equilibrium concept allows to reach agreements which are (some-
times) more compelling than Nash equilibrium agreements1, but, on the other hand, it
involves a problem of multiplicity of the set of solutions (and the corresponding draw-
backs of the solutions) which is even more evident with respect to the Nash equilibrium
concept. In fact, since in case of multiplicity a Nash equilibrium may be not robust with
respect to perturbations on the strategies or on the payos or it might be unstable with
respect to mutually benecial deviations of coalitions of players, a correlated equilibrium
may suer from the same drawbacks even more frequently. However, only few papers in
the literature have focused on the problem of correlated equilibrium selection; in partic-
ular, Myerson (1986) and Dhillon and Mertens (1996) focus on the problem of stability
with respect to trembles proposing some generalizations of the perfect equilibrium con-
cept while Milgrom and Roberts (1996), Moreno and Wooders (1996), Ray (1996) and
Bloch and Dutta (2009) look at renements of the correlated equilibrium concept based
on coalitional stability. In this work, we analyze renements of the correlated equilibria
based on altruistic behavior which generalize (in some sense) the concepts introduced
and investigated in De Marco and Morgan (2008;a,b).
Recent empirical and theoretical literature has shown that there exists a substantial
evidence suggesting that fairness motives aect the behavior of many people. Empirical
results (see for instance Fehr and Schimdt (1999) and references therein) and theoretical
papers (see Rabin (1993) or Falk and Fischbacher (2003) and references therein) show
how in some strategic situations altruistic behavior may emerge; in particular, most
theoretical papers describe reciprocal altruism and equilibrium behavior by considering
psychological game theory (Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989)) which usually
gives dierent predictions with respect to the standard notions of equilibrium in games2.
The idea to use altruistic behavior for equilibrium selection has been rstly proposed
in Rusinowska (2002) by introducing (in a class of bargaining problems) the concept of
friendly behavior: a player is supposed to move away from the equilibrium even only to
guarantee a better payo to the others. Friendliness equilibria (De Marco and Morgan
1Correlated equilibria usually enlarges the set of outcomes providing higher payos with respect to
some or all Nash equilibrium payo vectors.
2See also De Marco and Morgan (2008;a,b) for an extensive list of references on reciprocal altruism
in games.
2(2008,a)) provide an application of the friendly behavior property to general strategic
form games. While, the concept of slightly altruistic equilibrium (De Marco and Morgan
(2008,b)) is based on a stability property with respect to trembles which captures an idea
of reciprocal altruism: each player cares only about himself but his choice corresponds to
the limit of choices he would have done in equilibrium if he had cared about the others,
provided the others had done the same. In general, a slightly altruistic equilibrium is not
necessarily a friendliness equilibrium and viceversa. However, sucient conditions on the
payos of the game guarantee that every slightly altruistic equilibrium is a friendliness
equilibrium. Moreover, it is possible to enforce the robustness property of friendliness
equilibria (strong friendliness equilibria) in order to obtain strategy proles which are
also slightly altruistic equilibria.
In this work, rst, we extend the notion of slightly altruistic equilibria to correlated
strategies by introducing the so-called slightly altruistic correlated equilibrium concept.
It turns out from the examples that, on one hand, this concept can provide an eective
selection device for correlated equilibria and, on the other hand, it allows to reach agree-
ments which are more compelling than those determined by slightly altruistic (Nash)
equilibria. We show that existence of slightly altruistic correlated equilibria follows eas-
ily from the existence of slightly altruistic Nash equilibria; moreover, connections with
essentiality of equilibria are investigated3.
In the second part of the paper we study the role of friendly behavior in the problem
of correlated equilibrium selection and dene the concept of strong friendliness correlated
equilibrium. This concept, on one hand, provides an eective renement for slightly al-
truistic correlated equilibria. On the other hand, it is a natural extension of the strong
friendliness (Nash) equilibrium concept. We show also that there exist games with no
strong friendliness correlated equilibria and that it is possible to obtain a renement for
both the slightly altruistic correlated equilibrium and the strong friendliness correlated
equilibrium concepts by introducing altruistic equilibria. This latter concept is obtained
by enforcing the stability property in the denition of slightly altruistic correlated equi-
libria.
Finally, since the set of correlated equilibria is closed and convex and such properties
turn to be useful in the applications, we conclude the paper by analyzing such properties
for the set of solutions corresponding to the renement concepts introduced in this paper.
2 Slightly Altruistic Correlated Equilibria
2.1 Denition and existence
Let   = fI;X1;:::;XN;f1;:::;fNg be a N-player game where I = f1;:::;Ng is the set
of players, Xi is the nite set of strategies of player i, and fi : X ! R is the payo function
of player i, with X =
Q
i2I Xi. Denote with 
 the set of all probability distributions on
3Essentiality is the strongest kind of stability (with respect to perturbation) property for a solution
concept in a game (see Wu and Jiang (1962) or van Damme (1987)) .
3X.
Definition 2.1 (Aumann): A probability distribution  on X (also called correlated
strategy) is a correlated equilibrium if for every player i and every strategy  xi 2 Xi,
X
x i2X i
(x ij xi)fi( xi;x i) 
X
x i2X i
(x ij xi)fi(xi;x i) 8xi 2 Xi: (1)




e x i2X i ( xi;e x i)
whenever
P
e x i2X i ( xi;e x i) 6= 0 and (x ij xi) = 0 otherwise.
In other words, (x ij xi) is the probability that player i assigns to the strategy prole
x i of his opponents once the mediator has communicated player i to play  xi. Hence, 
is a correlated equilibrium if the expected payo from playing the recommended strategy
is no worse than playing any other strategy.





fj(x) for all x 2 X: (2)
Definition 2.2: Let " be a positive real number and, for each player i, let hi;" : X ! R
be the function, called "-altruistic payo, dened by:
hi;"(x) = fi(x) + "gi(x) for all x 2 X: (3)
For every " > 0, the game  " = fI;X1;:::;XN; h1;";:::;hN;"g is called the "-altruistic
game associated to   and C" denotes the set of its correlated equilibria.
Each hi;" represents the utility function of player i supposed to take into account the
sum of the payos of the opponents with weight ".
Therefore:
Definition 2.3: A correlated equilibrium  of the game   is said to be a slightly altruistic
correlated equilibrium if there exist a sequence of positive real numbers ("n)n decreasing
to 0 and a sequence of correlated strategies (n)n, such that
i) n is a correlated equilibrium of the "n-altruistic game  "n associated to  , for every
n 2 N.
ii) n converges to  as n ! 1.
Denote with SA
C the set of all slightly altruistic correlated equilibria.
Now let us give an illustrative example showing the eectiveness of this concept.
4Example 2.4: Let us consider the following 2  2-game:
Player 1, Player 2 L R
T 3,0 1,0
B 1,3 1,3
the set of Nash equilibria is E = ([0;1]  f0g) [ (f1g  [0;1]).
Denote with (;;;) a correlated strategy whose probability assignments are given




Therefore the correlated strategies corresponding to the Nash equilibria in mixed strate-
gies of the game are
N = f(;;0;0) j ;  0;  +  = 1g [ f(0;;0;) j ;  0;  +  = 1g
while it can be checked that the set of correlated equilibria is
C = f(;;0;) j ;;  0;  +  +  = 1g:
The " altruistic game associated to   is given by
Player 1, Player 2 L R
T 3,3" 1,"
B 1+3",3+" 1+3",3+"
In order to calculate the set of correlated equilibria C" of these " altruistic game, write
the conditions (1) corresponding to the perturbed games:
3 +   (1 + 3") + (1 + 3") , (2   3")  3" (4)
(1 + 3") + (1 + 3")  3 +  , 3"  (2   3") (5)
3" + (3 + ")  " + (3 + ") , 2"  0 (6)
" + (3 + ")  3" + (3 + ") , 2"  0 (7)
Therefore the " altruistic correlated equilibria are correlated strategies satisfying (4) to
(7). Taking the limit as " ! 0 we get
SA
C = f(;0;0;) j ;  0;  +  = 1g:
and therefore SA
C  C, i.e., slightly altruistic equilibria properly rene correlated equi-
libria.
5Correlated versus Nash
Given the nite game   denote with   = fI;S1;:::;SN;F1;:::;FNg its mixed extension
where each mixed strategy si 2 Si is a vector si = (si(xi))xi2Xi 2 R
jXij
+ such that P





fi(') for all s 2 S:
Definition 2.5 (De Marco and Morgan (2008,b)): A Nash equilibrium s of the game
  is said to be a slightly altruistic equilibrium if there exist a sequence of positive real
numbers ("n)n decreasing to 0 and a sequence of strategy proles (sn)n  S, such that
i) sn is a Nash equilibrium of  n for every n 2 N.
ii) sn converges to s as n ! 1.
Denote with SA
N the set of all slightly altruistic equilibria.
It immediately follows that
Proposition 2.6: Let s be a slightly altruistic (Nash) equilibrium then the probability
distribution on X induced by s is a slightly altruistic correlated equilibrium.
Since slightly altruistic equilibria in mixed strategies do always exist in nite games
we immediately conclude that
Theorem 2.7: Every nite game has a slightly altruistic correlated equilibrium.
Example 2.8: Consider the game in Example 2.4. It can be checked that the set of
slightly altruistic equilibria is (in terms of correlated strategies)
SA
N = f(1;0;0;0);(0;0;0;1)g:
It can be obviously recognized that (1;0;0;0) is favorable for player 1 but not for player
2 and, conversely, (0;0;0;1) is favorable for player 2 but not for player 1. However, the
presence of a mediator allows to reach an agreement which is fair for both the players and
which is stable with respect to altruism, by choosing, for instance the slightly altruistic
correlated equilibrium (1=2;0;0;1=2).
2.2 Essentiality
In this subsection, we analyze the relations between slightly altruistic correlated equilibria
and essentiality. Roughly speaking and analogously with essential Nash equilibria, a
correlated equilibrium  of a game   is essential if every game nearby   has a correlated
equilibrium nearby . Hence essentiality is a very strong stability concept. We show that
every essential correlated equilibrium is a slightly altruistic correlated equilibrium but
the set of essential correlated equilibria might be empty, implying that we cannot retrict
the attention only to essentiality.
Let jXj = K denote the cardinality of the set of all pure strategy proles, then
every payo function fi : X ! R has nite range, in particular yi = (fi(x))x2X is a
6K-dimensional vector for every player i. Then, it is possible to identify each game  
with and only one point y = (y1;:::;yn) 2 RnK. Therefore, denoting with G(X1;:::;Xn)
the set of n-player nite games with pure strategy sets (X1;:::;Xn), there is a one to
one correspondence between RnK and G(X1;:::;Xn). Then, one can dene a distance,
denoted by d( 0; 00), between the games  0 and  00 using the classical Euclidean distance
between the corresponding vectors in RnK. Hence
Definition 2.9: A correlated equilibrium  of   is said to be essential if for every  > 0
there exists  > 0 such that for every game  0 with d( ; 0) <  there exists a correlated
equilibrium 0 with d(;0) < .
Given a set valued map F : Z  Y recall that (Aubin and Frankowska(???))
Lim infz!z0F(z) =
n
y 2 Y j lim





y 2 Y j liminf




Remark 2.10: Denote with 
 the set of all probability distributions on X. Let C :
G(X1;:::;Xn) ! 
 be the set-valued map associating to every game   2 G(X1;:::;Xn)
the set C( ) of all correlated equilibria of  ; then, by denition,  is an essential correlated
equilibrium of   if and only if  2 Lim inf 0! C( 0)
Proposition 2.11: Every essential correlated equilibrium is a slightly altruistic corre-
lated equilibrium.
Proof. Since  is an essential correlated equilibrium for  , for every  2 N there exists
 > 0 such that any game  0 satisfying d( ; 0) <  has an equilibrium 0 such that
d(;0) < 1=. Let " be a positive real number such that the corresponding "-altruistic
game  " satises d( ; ") < . Hence, for every  2 N there exists a correlated
equilibrium  of  ", which satises d(;) < 1=. Consider a converging subsequence
(k)k2N of the sequence ()2N. Then, limk!1 k =  and  is a slightly altruistic
correlated equilibrium of  .
In the next example we show that essential correlated equilibria may not exist.
Example 2.12: Consider the game in Example 2.4. The set of slightly altruistic cor-
related equilibria is SA
C = f(;0;0;) j ;  0;  +  = 1g. Therefore, in light of
Proposition 2.11, essential correlated equilibria must belong to this set. Consider the
following perturbation  (%; ) of the game  
Player 1, Player 2 L R
T 3,0 %; 
B 1,3 1,3
with % > 1 and   > 0. The correlated equilibrium conditions (1) read
7i) 3 + %   + ; ii)  +   3 + %,
iii) 3    + 3, iv)   + 3  3
Condition ii) implies that  2  (%   1) =)  = 0. Condition iii) implies  = 0
and conditions i) and iv) impose no restrictions. This means that the set of correlated
equilibria C%;  of  (%; ) is given by
C%;  = f(0;;;0) j ;  0;  +  = 1g:
Since
Lim inf(%; )!(1;0)C%;  = Lim sup(%; )!(1;0)C%;  =
Lim(%; )!(1;0)C%;  = f(0;;;0) j ;  0;  +  = 1g:
and
SA
C \ Lim(%; )!(1;0)C%;  = ;
then   does not have essential correlated equilibria.
Remark 2.13: We emphasize that the previous example shows that C( ) * Lim inf 0! C( 0);
implying that, in general, C() is not a lower semicontinuous set-valued map.
3 Correlated Equilibria and Friendliness
In this section we show that slightly altruistic equilibria can be further rened by con-
sidering a dierent kind of altruistic behavior, namely the so called friendly behavior (see
Rusinowska (2002)). The application to correlated equilibria of the friendliness behavior
approach allows to obtain a sharper selection device based on altruistic behavior even
if this approach does not permit to dene a renement concept for correlated equilibria
satisfying a general existence theorem.
In fact, the next example shows that the concept of slightly altruistic equilibrium is
not always able to select a proper subset of the set of correlated equilibria. While, the
next subsection shows that strong friendliness correlated equilibria provide an eective
selection device in this game.
Example 3.1: Consider the following game:
Player 1, Player 2 L R
T 3,0 1,0
B 1,2 1,3
the correlated strategies corresponding to the Nash equilibria of the game are
N = f(;;0;0) j ;  0;  +  = 1g [ f(0;;0;) j ;  0;  +  = 1g
while it can be checked that the set of correlated equilibria is
C = f(;;0;) j ;;  0;  +  +  = 1g:
The " altruistic game associated to   is given by
8Player 1, Player 2 L R
T 3,3" 1,"
B 1+2",2+" 1+3",3+"
In order to calculate the set of correlated equilibria C" of these " altruistic games, write
the conditions (1) corresponding to the perturbed games:
3 +   (1 + 2") + (1 + 3") , 2(1   ")  3" (8)
(1 + 2") + (1 + 3")  3 +  , 3"  2(1   ") (9)
3" + (2 + ")  " + (3 + ") , 2"   (10)
" + (3 + ")  3" + (2 + ") , 2"   (11)
Therefore the set of " altruistic correlated equilibria are correlated strategies satisfying
(8-11). Taking the limit as " ! 0 we observe that the unique inequality which imposes
conditions is (10) which nally implies that
SA
C = C = f(;;;0) j ;  0;  +  +  = 1g: (12)
and therefore the concept of slightly altruistic correlated equilibrium provides no selection
in this example.
3.1 Strong Friendliness Correlated Equilibria
An individual can be considered to be well inclined towards other individuals if whenever
he is indierent between more alternatives he chooses the most favorable to the others.
Previous literature shows that this kind of behavior (called friendly behavior), can aect
the outcome of a game (see Rusinowska (2002)). In particular, in the framework of Nash
equilibrium selection, the strong friendliness (Nash) equilibrium concept (De Marco and
Morgan (2008,a)) says that if there are multiple best replies to opponents' strategy prole
of s i, then player i selects (one of) the strategies in this set maximizing the sum of
opponents' payos4.
Definition 3.2: A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies s of the game   is a strong











 i) is the set of the best replies in   of player i to his opponents' strategy
prole s






gj(x) for every mixed strategy prole s.
4In De Marco and Morgan (2008,a) the friendliness (Nash) equilibrium concept has also been inves-
tigated. This concept roughly says that if there are multiple Nash equilibria in which opponents play
a given prole of s i, then player i selects (one of) the equilibria in this set maximizing the sum of
opponents' payos. The interesting results concerning this concept in the framework of Nash equilibria
do not hold for the possible extensions of this concept to the case of correlated equilibria.
9We now extend this concept to correlated equilibria.
Definition 3.3: A correlated equilibrium  of the game   is said to be a strong friend-
liness correlated equilibrium if
X
x i2X i











Denote with FC the set of strong friendliness correlated equilibria.
Proposition 3.4: Let s be a strong friendliness Nash equilibrium and  the probability
distribution on X induced by s. Then,  is a strong friendliness correlated equilibrium.
Proof. Fix a player i. Since s is a Nash equilibrium, it follows that the probability
distribution  on X induced by s (i.e. (x) =
Q
i2I s
i(xi) for all x 2 X) is a correlated








 (x ij xi)fi(xi;x i) 8xi 2 Xi:








 (x jj xj)fj(e xj;x j): (14)
Denote with supp(s




j) = fxj 2 Xj j s

j(xj) > 0g:
If  xj = 2 supp(s








Suppose now that  xj 2 supp(s
j), then it follows that  xj 2 BRj(s



















 j) (resp. Fj(e xj;s
 j)) gives the expected payo to player from playing the
pure strategy  xj (resp. e xj) when his opponents are playing s
 j. Then, (14) implies that
e xj 2 BRj(s





 j(x j)gj( xj;x j) = Gi( xj;s


















 (x jj xj)(x j)gj(e xj;x j):
Hence the assertion follows.
Example 3.5: Consider again the game in Example 3.1 and recall that in this case
the set of correlated equilibria and slightly altruistic correlated equilibria coincide, i.e.
SA
C = C (see (12)). Now, apply conditions (13) to calculate strong friendliness corre-
lated equilibria:
3 +  =  +  ) 0  2 + 3 (15)
 +  = 3 +  ) 2 + 3  0 (16)
2 = 3 ) 3 +    +  (17)
3 = 2 )  +   3 +  (18)
If (;;;) is a correlated equilibrium, that is  = 0, then conditions (16) and (17)
impose no restrictions while (15) means that  = 0 =)  = 0 and (19) means that




C = f(;0;0;) j ;  0;  +  = 1g [ f(;;0;) j ;; > 0 and  +  +  = 1g
Remark 3.6: The set FC might be empty5. In fact, consider the following game
Player 1, Player 2 L R
T 1,-1 0,0
B 0,0 1,-2
This game has a unique correlated equilibrium which is not a strong friendliness correlated
equilibrium. In fact the correlated equilibrium conditions (1) read
i)   ; ii)   
iii)      2 iv)   2   
5The conditions in the denition of strong friendliness (Nash) equilibria are somehow similar to those
in the denition of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) (see Mynard Smith and Price (1973)), even if
there are no general connections between the two concepts. However, since it is well known that ESS may
not exist, the analogous lack of existence of strong friendliness Nash equilibria and of strong friendliness
correlated equilibria seems to be natural. The denition of ESS is the following: Consider a symmetric
two player game   = ff1;2g;X1;X2;f1;f2g, where X1 = X2 = A and f1(z;y) = f2(y;z) = f(z;y).
Denote with S the set of probability distribution on X and with F(p;q) =
P
x2A2 p(x1)q(x2)f(x1;x2).
Then a strategy p 2 S is an evolutionary stable strategy if: 1) F(p;p)  F(q;p) for all q 2 S; 2)F(p;p) =
F(q;p) and p 6= q =) F(p;q) > F(q;q). While the denition of symmetric strong friendliness Nash
equilibrium in symmetric 2-player game collapses to 1) F(p;p)  F(q;p) for all q 2 S; 2)F(p;p) =
F(q;p) =) F(p;p)  F(p;q):
11which imply that
 =  = 2 = 2:
These latter inequalities together with  +  +  +  = 1 imply that  =  = 1=3 and
 =  = 1=6. Then (1=3;1=3;1=6;1=6) is the unique correlated equilibrium. Now, apply
conditions (13), we get
 =  )     2
 =  )  2   
  =  2 )   
 2 =   )   
The latter of those condition implies that    which is a contradiction since 1=6 =  <
 = 1=3. Hence (1=3;1=3;1=6;1=6) is not a strong friendliness correlated equilibrium
and FC = ;.
Relation between SA
C and FC
Example 3.1 already shows that slightly altruistic correlated equilibria and strong friend-
liness correlated equilibria may dier. Now we analyze the connections between the two
concepts: the next result shows that FC  SA
C while, in the next subsection, enforcing
the stability condition in the denition of slightly altruistic correlated equilibrium (by
introducing the altruistic equilibrium concept) allows to nd elements in the intersection
FC \ SA
C.
Proposition 3.7: If  is a strong friendliness correlated equilibrium then it is a slightly
altruistic correlated equilibrium.
Proof. Let  be a strong friendliness correlated equilibrium. Fix a strategy xi; if
X
x i2X i
(x ij xi)fi( xi;x i)  
X
x i2X i
(x ij xi)fi(e xi;x i) = ( xi;e xi) > 0
then there exists "( xi;e xi) > 0 such that, for every 0 < " < "( xi;e xi), it results that











Denote with ( xi) = fe xi 2 Xi j ( xi;e xi) > 0g and let "( xi) = mine xi2( xi) "( xi;e xi). Let
e xi 2 Xi n( xi), (i.e. ( xi;e xi) = 0); since  is a strong friendliness correlated equilibrium












12Summarizing, for every 0 < " < "( xi), we get that,
X
x i2X i
(x ij xi)fi( xi;x i)  
X
x i2X i











5 8e xi 2 Xi
Hence  is a "-altruistic correlated equilibrium for every "  mini2N;xi2Xi "(xi) and we
get the assertion
3.2 Altruistic Correlated Equilibria
Definition 3.8: A correlated equilibrium  is said to be an altruistic correlated equilib-
rium if there exists  > 0 such that  2
T
0" C". Denote with AC the set of altruistic
correlated equilibria.
Proposition 3.9: If  is an altruistic correlated equilibrium then it is a strong friend-
liness correlated equilibrium and a slightly altruistic correlated equilibrium.
Proof. From the assumption it follows that  is a correlated equilibrium then for every
player i and every strategy  xi 2 Xi,
X
x i2X i
(x ij xi)fi( xi;x i) 
X
x i2X i
(x ij xi)fi(xi;x i) 8xi 2 Xi:
Suppose that for a player j and strategies  xj;e xj 2 Xj it results that
X
x j2X j
(x jj xj)fj( xj;x j) =
X
x j2X j
(x jj xj)fj(e xj;x j): (19)
From the assumption there exists 0 <  such that, for 0 < "  ,  is a correlated
equilibrium of  ". Then
X
x j2X j




Since hj;" = fj + "gj, in light of (19) it follows that
X
x j2X j




Then  is a a strong friendliness correlated equilibrium. Since  is also a slightly altruistic
equilibrium, we get the assertion.
13Example 3.10: Consider the game in Example 3.1. The set of altruistic correlated
equilibria coincides with the set of strong friendliness correlated equilibria. In fact for
every ;  0 with + = 1, (;0;0;) satises conditions (8),(9),(10 and (11). Rewrite











2" diverge to +1 as " & 0 then for every ;; > 0 with
 +  +  = 1 it is possible to nd "(;;) such that for every "  "(;;) conditions
in (20) are satised. That is (;;0;) 2 C" for every "  "(;;). Hence every strong
friendliness equilibrium of this game is an altruistic equilibrium. Then, the previous
proposition implies that the two concept coincide in this example, that is FC = AC.
4 Properties of the Set of Solutions
The concept of correlated equilibrium seems to be so appealing also because the corre-
sponding set of solutions satises two important properties which turn to be very useful in
the applications: convexity and closedness. In this section we investigate these properties
for the set of solutions given by the equilibrium concepts dened above. Unfortunately
none of them satises both the properties.
4.1 Slightly Altruistic Correlated Equilibria
Even if in all the investigated examples the set of slightly altruistic correlated equilibria
SA
C is convex, we are not able to establish a general convexity result for this set of
solutions. However, we show that convexity appears by enforcing the stability property
in the denition of slightly altruistic equilibria. In fact:
Proposition 4.1: If the set of slightly altruistic correlated equilibria SA
C satises the
following Strong Slightly Altruistic Stability Property:
[SA Property]: For every  2 SA
C and for every sequence of positive real
numbers ("n)n decreasing to 0 there exists a sequence of correlated strategies (n)n, such
that
i) n is a correlated equilibrium of the "n-altruistic game  "n associated to  , for every
n 2 N.
ii) n converges to  as n ! 1.
Then, SA
C is convex.
Proof. Let ! and  two correlated equilibria of   and ("n)n a sequence of positive real
numbers decreasing to 0. Then there exist sequences of correlated strategies (!n)n and
(n)n, such that !n and n are correlated equilibria of the "n-altruistic game  "n for every
14n 2 N, and !n converges to ! and n converges to  as n ! 1. Let t 2]0;1[, now we show
that  = t!+(1 t) is a slightly altruistic correlated equilibrium of  . In fact, since the
sets of correlated equilibria are convex, n = t!n + (1   t)n is a correlated equilibrium
of  "n for every n. Moreover n converges to  as n ! 1 and then  2 SA
C.
Remark 4.2: The fact that the SA Property is required for the convexity of the set
SA
C comes from well known properties of upper and lower limits of set valued maps (see
Aubin and Frankowska (1990) or Rockafellar and Wets (1997)).
Given a set valued map F : Z  Y recall that Recall that given a set K, co(K)
denotes the convex hull of K. Then we have
co(Lim infz!z0F(z))  Lim infz!z0co(F(z))
but in general
co(Lim supz!z0F(z)) * Lim supz!z0co(F(z)):
By denition, SA
C = Lim sup"!0C" = Lim sup"!0co(C"), being C" convex for every ".
If SA
C satises the SA Property then SA
C = Lim inf"!0C" = Lim inf"!0co(C") and
therefore SA
C = co(Lim inf"!0C") which implies that SA
C is convex.
Proposition 4.3: The set SA
C of slightly altruistic correlated equilibria is closed.
Proof. Let ()2N be a sequence converging to  with  2 SA
C for every  2 N. By
denition of slightly altruistic equilibria it follows that for every  2 N there exist a
sequence of positive real numbers ("
n)n2N converging to 0 and a sequence of strategy
proles (
n)n2N converging to  such that 
n 2 C"
n for every n 2 N. For every  2 N




 for every n  n. With an abuse
of notation denote with  = 
n and with " = "
n for every  2 N. By compactness
we can extract converging subsequences, with an abuse of notation again denoted with
(")2N and ()2N, such that  2 C" for every  2 N. Clearly " ! 0. Moreover,




every   . Hence for every " there exists  such that, for every   ,







and  2 SA
C.
4.2 Strong Friendliness Correlated Equilibria
Proposition 4.4: The set FC of strong friendliness correlated equilibria is convex.
Proof. Let ! and  be equilibria in FC, then !; 2 C, that is for every player i, every
strategy  xi 2 Xi,
X
x i2X i
! (x ij xi)fi( xi;x i) 
X
x i2X i
! (x ij xi)fi(xi;x i) 8xi 2 Xi; (21)
X
x i2X i
 (x ij xi)fi( xi;x i) 
X
x i2X i
 (x ij xi)fi(xi;x i) 8xi 2 Xi: (22)
15Therefore if  = t! + (1   t) it follows that  2 C, that is for every player i and every
strategy  xi 2 Xi
X
x i2X i
(x ij xi)fi( xi;x i) 
X
x i2X i
(x ij xi)fi(xi;x i) 8xi 2 Xi: (23)
Moreover, if for a pair of strategies  xi;e xi 2 Xi, at least one of the inequalities in (21) or
(22) is strict then the inequality in (23) is also strict. If  xi;e xi 2 Xi are such that the




! (x ij xi)gi( xi;x i) 
X
x i2X i
! (x ij xi)gi(e xi;x i);
X
x i2X i
 (x ij xi)gi( xi;x i) 
X
x i2X i
 (x ij xi)gi(e xi;x i):
and hence it follows that
X
x i2X i




which nally implies that  is a strong friendliness correlated equilibrium. Hence FC is
convex.
Remark 4.5: The set of strong friendliness equilibria is not necessarily closed since the
set FC in Example 3.1 is not closed.
4.3 Altruistic Correlated Equilibria
Proposition 4.6: The set AC of altruistic correlated equilibria is convex.
Proof. Let !; 2 AC, then there exist !; > 0 such that ! 2
T
0"! C" and  2 T
0" C". If  = minf!;g, then !; 2
T
0" C". For every ", the set C" of
correlated equilibria of the " altruistic games is convex so t! +(1 t) 2
T
0" C" for
every t 2]0;1[ which implies that t! + (1   t) 2 AC for every t 2]0;1[. Hence AC is
convex.
Remark 4.7: The set of altruistic equilibria is not necessarily closed since the set AC in
Example (3.1) is not closed.
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